Xu Qinduo

    xuqinduo@gmail.com

    AUSTRALIAN Prime Minister Tony Abbot has been in the media’s focus recently for candid remarks he made on the factors driving his China policy: fear and greed. Abbot was speaking to German Chancellor Angela Merkel right before the G20 meeting late last year in Brisbane.

    Greed — the consideration of economic interest by doing trade and investment with China — is in line with other countries. China is the largest trading partner for about 150 countries around the world. Australia is no exception. In fact, China represents some 35 percent of Australia’s foreign trade, and Canberra emerged from the 2008 financial crisis unscathed largely due to its booming trade with Beijing.

    But fear?

    For many in China, it is hard to believe that Australia, which is far away from China and has never been involved in any direct conflicts with China, has a fear of China. Where is that fear coming from? How does the fear factor affect Australian national policy toward Beijing?

    The fear factor can be traced as far back as the 1850s when the Gold Rush took large groups of Chinese workers Down Under. There was a practical need for Chinese laborers at that time, but there was also a concern about the inflow of Chinese, which lead to the “Influx of Chinese Restriction Act” in 1881 in the New South Wales parliament.

    Currently, China and India are the two largest sources of migrants to Australia. The concern of too many Asian immigrants was very much alive as recently as 1996, when a far right politician was elected to parliament based on her slogan that Australia “was in danger of being swamped by Asians.”

    So the mindset of fear of Chinese and Asians in general has sort of lingered on in some corners of Australian society for a long time. Given the fact that Australia’s total population equals only that of Beijing, it is not hard to understand the unease of some Australians.

    But for Abbot, the fear factor is actually more about the rise of China or the uncertainty brought about by a rising China and the challenges that will present to the current international order dominated by its ally the United States. Put simply, what if there’s a conflict between China and the U.S.? How would Canberra respond to that potential confrontation?

    A better word to describe the Australian mentality is probably “anxiety” or “dilemma” over its relationship with the two most important countries in the world: China and the U.S. Canberra has forged so close a bond with China economically that the country’s prosperity is almost linked to the Chinese economic performance; but in terms of defense, Australia is a traditional ally of Washington.

    In an unlikely but not inconceivable scenario of direct military confrontation between Beijing and Washington, which side will Canberra be on? That’s the big debate ongoing inside Australia.

    Fear, anxiety, or dilemma, what ultimately matters is the policy Australia takes toward China and the U.S. Reflective of that complex thinking is Australia’s “engage and hedge” policy toward Beijing. Engaging is seen more in economic and cultural terms, such as the free trade deal signed last year between China and Australia and the newly launched Chinese-language website by Australian Broadcasting Corp. Hedging focuses more on military policies, including the hosting of U.S. forces in Darwin and joining the U.S. and the Philippines in drills in the South China Sea.

    But here’s the bigger question: by siding with the U.S. and hedging against China, does Canberra act in its own best interest? Is that the best policy Australia can produce?

    Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wrote in a report to Harvard University, “Australians, wherever practical and possible, seek to act as a bridge if there are problems to be solved [between China and the U.S.].”

    However, Australia could go beyond that and adopt a proactive policy to act as a bridge, not wherever practical and possible, but whenever the opportunity arises, to iron out the differences and reduce misunderstandings between Beijing and Washington.

    For example, Canberra can actively lobby Washington to include China in the TPP — Trans-Pacific Partnership — trade deal, which is being sold as geopolitically necessary to counter the rise of China. That, if successful, would be a remarkable contribution by Australia to peace and stability in the region. Even if it fails, Australia will earn good will and admiration from Beijing and other regional players for its efforts to ward off geopolitical risks.

    (The author is a current affairs commentator with China Radio International and a visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne.)