Xu Qinduo

    xuqinduo@gmail.com

    ON the same day that Australia released its Defense White Paper, its former Defense Minister Kevin Andrews made a call for Canberra to send warships within 12 nautical miles of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbot made a similar call in Japan on Friday. Is it wise for Canberra to threaten to shirtfront Beijing in the South China Sea? Can it afford the consequences of rocking the boat with China, its largest trading partner?

    Based on the White Paper, Australia is to increase its military spending to A$190 billion (US$266 billion) in the next 10 years. The major feature in the military build-up is China, as suggested in news stories like “With an eye on China’s rise, Australia to boost defense spending by $21 billion” by Reuters or “Australia takes steps to counter China’s rising military power” by the Wall Street Journal.

    The dramatic expansion is seen as a move to deepen its strategic alliance with the United States in their efforts to counter the rise of China. Naturally, China expressed its “dissatisfaction” with Australia’s negative remarks about China in justifying its military expansion. The Chinese defense ministry spoke more frankly and asked Canberra to stay out of China’s territorial disputes. Correspondingly, the U.S. praised Canberra, describing the White Paper as a “well-considered, comprehensive approach to addressing evolving security challenges of the coming decades.”

    Australia sees its alliance with the U.S. as the bedrock of its national security, and the country has for decades been trying to prove to Washington that it’s a valuable ally. The latest military expansion is just another effort to express its loyalty to Washington’s pet project of “pivoting” or “rebalancing” toward Asia. Besides, Australia is the only country that has joined Washington in every war since WWII. A joke in the diplomatic world goes like this: when Washington asks Canberra to jump, the only question it asks is “how high?”

    Former Defense Minister Andrews and Prime Minister Abbot’s call came just days after the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph P. Aucoin, said it would be “valuable” if Australia conducted “freedom of navigation” operations similar to the U.S. in the South China Sea.

    The U.S. has been flexing its muscles in the region since last year by sending warships close to islands under Chinese control. It even flew a B-52 bomber over Chinese islands.

    By urging Australia to send warships close to Chinese islands, the U.S. seems to have set the height for Canberra to jump. Politicians, including those from the opposition Labor Party, are beating the drum for the moment of confronting China.

    In the rush to do Washington’s bidding, some officials seem to forget or ignore the subtlety surrounding the South China Sea situation. For example, on the Nansha Islands, or the Spratly, it’s Vietnam that occupies the largest number of outposts, 48 compared to eight by China. And China’s reclamation work is a reaction to similar efforts by other countries.

    Even the reported air-to-surface missile and possible radar systems by China are defensive by nature and limited in number, a sharp contrast to a B-52 bomber, which is able to carry nuclear bombs.

    The much-hyped concern of freedom of navigation is also largely groundless and abused by Washington to serve its purpose to deepen its military presence in the region. For one thing, China is the major destination for Australia’s mineral resources and many other products. Since the bilateral Free Trade Deal came into effect late last year, trade between the two countries will grow further. China, as the largest trading nation in the world, has as many reasons as Canberra, if not more, to maintain the free flow of goods in the South China Sea. Furthermore, no incidents so far have affected the freedom of navigation.

    Former Australia defense official Allan Behm once said, “Australian neutrality or support for China in the event of any war between the U.S. and China would not be a realistic strategic response.” The idea continues to dominate the mentality of Canberra, despite strong economic ties to China.

    The side effect of Australia becoming involved in a shooting match between China and the U.S. would be an economic disaster for Canberra, not a strategic one. What’s even worse, if Australia were to become a “defeated ally of a defeated superpower … unlike America, we cannot retreat to the Western Hemisphere,” as warned by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer in his book “Australia’s Dangerous Ally.”

    In a less risky scenario where Australia chooses to confront China by flying or sailing into the 12-nautical miles of Chinese islands, what if an Australian plane was shot down by the PLA? Will Washington sacrifice its ties with China, say, by waging a war for the loss of Australian lives?

    China treasures its relationship with Australia and has become the largest investor in the island country. A third of Australia’s international students are from China. China has never considered Australia, which is remote and rather isolated, a hostile country. On the other side, Australia has little to do with the South China Sea, which is on one level regional territorial dispute and on a higher level a bone of contention between China and the U.S., which fears the loss of its dominant position in Asia.

    Australia has so far refused to confront China directly in the South China Sea by not making it clear if or when it will start close-in freedom navigation operations. Being practical and flexible is necessary, particularly in such a complicated situation as the South China Sea.

    (The author is a current affairs commentator with China Radio International and a visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne.)